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We study the Groves-Ledyard mechanism for determining optimal amounts of public goods in 
economies whose agents have the most general class of preferences for which a Pareto amount 
of public goods can be computed independently of income distribution. We use degree theory on 
afline spaces to show that the number of equilibria in such economies grows exponentially as the 
number of agents in the economy increases. The large number of equilibria in such simple 
economic models raises doubts as to whether the Groves-Ledyard mechanism is a workable 
solution to the Free Rider Problem since individuals may have incentives to falsify their 
preferences in order to drive the adjustment process to a preferred Nash equilibrium. 
1. Introduction 
Groves and Ledyard (1977) introduced a decentralized method for 
determining optimal levels of public goods. They formulated a government 
allocation-taxation scheme which has a Nash equilibrium such that (1) the 
public good is produced at an optimal level, (2) there is neither a budget 
surplus nor deficit, and (3) consumers find it in their self-interest to reveal 
their true preferences for public goods. If one is willing to accept Nash 
equilibrium as the appropriate equilibrium concept, then the Groves- 
Ledyard mechanism can be regarded as a solution to the classical Free Rider 
Problem for public goods. 
In a later paper, Groves and Ledyard (1980) present general abstract 
conditions under which equilibrium for their mechanism exists. However, 
they have no results concerning the multiplicity of equilibria. Multiple Nash 
equilibria are an especially vexing problem in this case because a practical 
implementation of the Groves-Ledyard mechanism must incorporate an 
adjustment process for attaining Nash equilibria. If there are multiple 
equilibria with differing distributions of utility, then individuals may have an 
incentive to falsify their preferences in order to drive the adjustment process 
to a preferred Nash equilibrium. If on the other hand Groves-Ledyard 
equilibrium is unique, then it is easy to devise adjustment mechanisms which 
are cheatproof and converge to the Groves-Ledyard equilibrium. 
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Applied microeconomists studying simulated or actual environments with 
public goods usually work with specific families of utility functions which are 
analytically malleable and which behave nicely under aggregation. They are 
interested in the existence, uniqueness, and characterization of the equilibria 
which arise in these more concrete situations. In this paper, we study the 
Groves-Ledyard mechanism for the two most convenient families of 
preferences for this purpose. These are: (1) quasi-linear utility with constant 
marginal utility of private goods, and (2) the more general utility functions 
which are dual to the Gorman polar form for private goods economies. The 
latter is the most general class of preferences for which a Pareto amount of 
public goods can be computed independently of income distribution. Both of 
these environments always have Groves-Ledyard equilibria. However, for the 
second class of preferences there are multiple equilibria. In fact, the number 
of equilibria grows exponentially as the number of agents in the economy 
increases. This suggests that the Groves-Ledyard mechanism may not be a 
workable solution to the free-rider problem. 
In finding and counting the number of Groves-Ledyard equilibria in the 
more general models, we use some mathematical techniques which we believe 
to be at least as interesting as the results they lead to and which are powerful 
yet simple tools for dealing with equilibria in many situations where neither 
the domain nor the range of the equilibrium map is compact. In our 
situation, both spaces are linear subspaces of R”. We replace the usual 
compactness criteria in equilibrium computations with the notation of a 
‘proper mapping’ and then use degree theory to illustrate how knowledge 
about the behaviour of a mapping at one point in its image can yield lower 
bounds for the preimages of other points in the target space. In our model, 
the target space parametrizes the public goods economies and the pre-images 
of a point in the target space are the Groves-Ledyard equilibria. 
2. The general model 
Consider a community with a number I2 3 of citizens. Each citizen i has a 
utility function of the form ui(Xi, Y) where Xi is his consumption of private 
goods and Y is the amount of public goods supplied to the community. For 
the present, let us suppose that there is just one private good and one public 
good so that Xi and Y are simply non-negative real numbers. Let us also 
suppose that public goods can be obtained in exchange for private goods at 
a constant unit cost. If we do so, there is no loss of generality in choosing 
units of measurement so that one unit of private good can be exchanged for 
exactly one unit of public good. There is a ‘government’ which collects ‘taxes’ 
in the form of private goods from individuals and exchanges its tax revenue 
for public goods which it provides to the community. The amount of taxes 
collected from each individual and the amount of public goods provided will 
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be determined by the government as a function of a list of ‘messages’ that it 
receives from the citizens. Each citizen sends a message which is a number 
mi, positive or negative, that expresses his desired increment in the output of 
the public good. Let the vector m =(ml,. . . , ml) denote the list of messages 
received by the government. The government’s rules of action can then be 
described by functions C,(m) for each i and Y(m) where C,(m) is person i’s 
tax bill and Y(m) is the amount of public goods supplied if the list of 
messages is m. 
If a consumer has wealth w before taxes, and the list of messages is m, 
then his private consumption will equal his after-tax wealth, I& -Ci(rn). 
Therefore if the list of messages is m, his utility level will be 
Ui(m)Eui(X,(m), Y(m)), where (I) 
X,(m)= I%--i(m). (2) 
A consumer choosing his message is confronted with a game in which each 
of the I players chooses a strategy m, and where the payoff function is (1). A 
Nash equilibrium for this game is a vector m* = (m:, . . . , m:) such that 
Ui(m:, . . . ,m~_,,m,*,m~+l ,... ,mF) 
* 2Ui(mT ,..., Wli*_,,mi,mi+, ,..., ml*) - (3) 
for all real numbers m, and for each i. Groves and Ledyard study Nash 
equilibria for a game of this form where the functions Y(m) and C,(m) are 
judiciously chosen. 
The functions Y(m) and C,(m) proposed by Groves and Ledyard are 
Y(m) =I mi, 
I 
and, for all i, 




where y and the CLi’s are arbitrarily chosen parameters such that y >O and 
xi ui = 1, and where 
(6) 
(7) 
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A Nash equilibrium for the game described by eqs. (1) through (5) will be 
called a Groves-Ledyard equilibrium. 
The workings of the Groves-Ledyard government can be described 
informally. Each citizen is asked to name a single quantity which he would 
like to add to or subtract from the amount of public good ordered by others. 
A positive number mi denotes an addition and a negative m, a subtraction, 
The government will supply the sum of the quantities named by the citizens. 
Citizen i’s tax will consist of a predetermined share ai of the total value of 
public good supplied plus an amount that is proportional to the squared 
deviation of his demand from the average of other citizens’ mi’s less an 
amount that is proportional to the variance of the mi’s stated by others. This 
last term, giZ, is entirely independent of i’s choice of mi. 
With some algebraic manipulation of expression (4) and (5) it can be 
shown that 
Y(m) = C Ci (ml, 
for all m. Therefore the Groves-Ledyard government always balances its 
budget. Groves and Ledyard show that if preferences are convex then the 
Groves-Ledyard equilibrium produces a Pareto optimal allocation. 
In this paper we assume that ui(Xi, Y) is strictly quasi-concave and twice 
continuously differentiable. We will be primarily interested in ‘interior’ 
Groves-Ledyard equilibria. These are equilibria in which Y(m*) >O and 
Xi(m*) >O for all i. In fact, for the class of economies that we study, 
reasonable economic assumptions can be found which guarantee that all 
Groves-Ledyard equilibria are interior. 
A necessary condition for m* to be a Groves-Ledyard equilibrium is that 
t3Ui(m*)/dmi =0 for all i. Differentiating (1) with respect to m, we see that 
this first-order condition is equivalent to 
Xi (WI*) 
-------= 
hi (Xi (m*), Y(m*)) 1 f3Ui (Xi (m*), Y(m*)) 
dmi dY ax, ’ 
for every i. In fact, given quasi-concavity of ui(Xi, Y), eq. (9) is sufficient as 
well as necessary for mi* to satisfy (3).’ 
Differentiating (5) reveals that 
aCAm) 
-=q+y ami ( > !+ (mi-_i)=Cli +Y(WZi -@I), (10) 
‘If u,(X,, Y) is quasi-concave in Xi and Y then UT(m) is a quasi-concave function of mi. This 
follows from straightforward application of the definition of quasi-concavity, the fact that C,(m) 
is a convex function of mi and that utility is an increasing function of E Since UT(m) is quasi- 
concave, the first-order condition for maximization is suflicient. 
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where %=(1/Z) xi m,. Therefore eqs. (9) can be written as 
cli + y(mi” -PC*) = 
aui(xi(m*), y(m*)) I aui(xi(m*), y(m*)) 
dY dX, * 
(11) 
A necessary and sufficient condition for m* to be a Groves-Ledyard 
equilibrium is that m* solve the equations system (2), (4) and (11). We will 
exploit this fact in solving for and enumerating Groves-Ledyard equilibria. 
Pareto efficiency of the Groves-Ledyard equilibrium can be demonstrated 
by showing that eqs. (2), (4) and (11) imply the well-known Samuelson lirst- 
order necessary and sufficient conditions for Pareto optimal allocation when 
preferences are convex. To see this we sum eqs. (11) over all i to obtain 
1=x 
i( 
aui(xi(m*), Y(m*)) L h(xi(m*), Y(m*)) 
LJY > ax, * 
(12) 
[Here we use the obvious fact that the sum over i of the right-hand in side 
(10) equals one.] Eq. (12) requires the summed marginal rates of substitution 
for the public good to equal the marginal rate of transformation between 
private and public goods. If we add the budget eqs. (2) and substitute from 
(8), we find that 
TXi(m*) + Y(m*) =T W. (13) 
Since preferences are assumed to be convex, eqs. (12) and (13) imply that 
(xr(m*), . . . , X,(m*), Y(m*)) is a Pareto optimal allocation. 
3. Quasi-linear utility 
In the simplest models of economies with public goods, all citizens have 
quasi-linear utility (constant marginal utility of private goods). See, for 
example, Feldman (1980, ch. 6). In such models, computing Groves-Ledyard 
equilibrium is particularly simple and it turns out that equilibrium is unique. 
Quasi-linear utility has the special form 
ui(xi, y)=xi +fi(y), (14) 
for some strictly concave function A. In this case, the first-order condition 
(11) specializes to 
a, +y(mr-fi*)=f:(Y(m*)). (15) 
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Summing eq. (15) over i yields 
1 =Cf:(Y(m*)). (16) 
Since, by assumption, f; ~0 for all i, there can be at most one value of 
Y that satisfies (16). Let this value be Y*= Y(m*). According to eq. (4) 
Y* = ci rn? = kii*. Therefore eq. (15) can be rearranged as 
rnr =~(/l(v*)-ai) +F, (17) 
which solves uniquely for m:. 
So far we have shown that there can be no more than one interior 
Groves-Ledyard equilibrium when preferences are quasi-linear. We must also 
find conditions which insure that there is at least one interior equilibrium. 
Let us assume that the problem is non-trivial in the sense that Pareto 
effkiency requires positive aggregate outputs of both public and private 
goods. Then there will exist some Y* such that Ci fj(Y*)= 1 and 
Y* <xi M$ We show that if this assumption holds, there will always exist 
some parameters aI,. . . , cz, and y for which an interior Groves-Ledyard 
equilibrium exists. 
An interior Groves-Ledyard equilibrium will exist if for m* defined by 
(17), we have 
Xi(m*) = l4( -Ci(m*)>O. (18) 
Using eqs. (4), (5), (7) and (17) we can show that 
Ci(Wl*)~LXi Y*+’ 
I ( > ~ (f:(Y*)--ai)'. 2y z-1 (19) 
Therefore if cli Y* < K for all i, then (18) would hold for all sufficiently large 
y. But since by assumption, Y*<ci w, we could guarantee that aiY* < vr/;. 
by setting CQ =(K& IQ. Therefore there are always some cli’s and a y for 
which an interior Groves-Ledyard equilibrium exists. 
4. A more general class of preferences 
Finding a unique Groves-Ledyard equilibrium in the case of quasi-linear 
utility was easy because there were no ‘income effects’ on individual marginal 
rates of substitution. On the other hand, available empirical evidence 
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convincingly refutes the hypothesis that individual marginal willingness to 
pay for public goods is independent of the level of one’s private 
consumption. Therefore we study the Groves-Ledyard equilibrium in more 
general environments. We consider a family of utility functions that lies 
intermediate in generality between quasi-linear utility and general quasi- 
concave functions. This class was introduced by Bergstrom and Cornes 
(1981, 1983) and consists of preferences representable by a utility function of 
the form 
Ui(xip Y)=A(Y)Xi +Bi(Y)y (20) 
for each i. Bergstrom and Cornes show that this class of preferences, which is 
dual to the Got-man polar form for private goods is exactly the class for 
which a Pareto amount of public goods can be computed independently of 
income distribution. This class is considerably broader than the quasi-linear 
class and allows individual marginal rates of substitution to depend on 
consumption of private goods as well as public goods. 
If utility functions are of this form, then individual marginal rates of 
substitution between public good and private goods can be written as 
aui(xi, y, _ aui(xi, y, 
l3Y 
x, + G(Y) 




B:(Y) A(Y) and big- 
A(Y) ’ 
Then the equations system (2), (4), (11) that constitutes the first-order 
conditions for a Groves-Ledyard equilibrium is 
a(Y(m*))Xi(m*)+bi(Y(m*))=Ui +r(m,*-m*), (22) 
c mi” = Y(m*), 
I 
(23) 
x,(m*) = y - Ci(m*), (24) 
where Ci(m*) is defined by (5). 
Summing eq. (22) over all i yields 
4 Y(m)) X(m) + 1 bi ( Y(m)) = 1, 
L 
(25) 
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where 
x(m)ECxi(m). (26) 
Summing eqs. (24) over all i and recalling (8) we have 
X(m) =I w - Y(m). 
i 
(27) 
The assumption that Ui(Xi, Y) is strictly quasi-concave is equivalent to the 
assumption that l/A(Y) is a strictly convex function and B,(Y) is a strictly 
concave function of Y* Therefore if each U,(X,, Y) is strictly quasi-concave, 
then so is the ‘aggregate utility function’, 
U(X, Y)-A(Y)X+CBi(Y)* (28) 
Now (25) is the first-order condition for maximizing (28) subject to the 
constraint (27). If preferences are strictly quasi-concave, therefore, eq. (27) 
will have at most one solution for X(m) and Y(m). If we also assume that the 
problem is non-trivial in the sense that there is some Pareto optimal 
allocation with positive total outputs of both public and private goods, then 
there is exactly one aggregate output vector (X*, Y*) that satisfies (25). 
Having solved for Y* =ci mf, we have next to solve for the individual 
m*‘s from the equation system (22) and (24). Let a*=a(Y*) and b* =bi(Y*). 
Then this system of equations can be reduced to 
CZ*Ci(m*)+y(mf-ti*)=tZ*~+b:-Cti. (29) 
Recalling (5) we notice that (29) is a quadratic function in the variables 





Substituting from (30) into (29) and rearranging terms leads to 
qf--izqF=ki for i=l,...,I, 
1 
(31) 
‘Quasi-concavity of U(X, Y) =A( Y)X+B( Y) is seen to be equivalent to convexity of the 
function h(Y)=(l/A(Y))u-(B(Y)/A(Y)) for all 1120. But h(Y) is convex for all ~20 if and only 
if (l/A(Y)) is a convex function and (B( Y)/A( Y)) is a concave function of Y 
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where 
(32) 
(See appendix 1 for more details of these computations.) Summing (30) over i 
yields 
T4i=g. (33) 
The Ix I system of eq. (31) is linear in the squares of the qi’s and is of rank 
I- 1. The other equation, eq. (33), is linear in the qi’s. 
Finally, we set Zi =(a*/(Z_2))qi and rewrite (31) and (33) in terms of the 
zi’s. This yields 
and 
A(zf,. . . , z:) =(kl,. . . , k,), (34) 
Tzizl, (35) 
where A is an Z x Z matrix for which the off-diagonal elements are all l’s and 
the diagonal elements are all 1 -I. The rows of the symmetric matrix A sum 
to (0,. . . ) 0). In fact, the rank of A is I- 1, and its null space is spanned by 
the vector (1,. . ., 1). Since the row space (and column space) of A is 
orthogonal complement of the null space, (k,, . . . , k,) is in the image (i.e., 
column space) of A if and only if 
the 
the 
(k 1 ,..., k,)*(l)..., l)=O, i.e., Cki=O. 
One uses (32) to check that the ki’s do indeed sum to zero. So (34) has a line 
of ‘solutions’ (z:, . . . , zf) for each (k 1,..., k,) defined by (32). One then uses 
(35) to reduce this solution set to a finite number of points. Finally, one uses 
zi =(a*/(Z-2))q, and (30) to find the unique message m* which corresponds 
to each one of these solutions z* of (34) and (35). 
The ki’S in (32) contain all the exogenous data of the model. For example, 
if each citizen has the same wealth y and the same preferences, and if the 
tax shares are equalized so that each cli equals l/Z, then ki = 0 for i = 1,. . . , I. 
So, in a sense, k represents the deviation from perfect symmetry. The solution 
to (34) in this special case where k, =. . . = k, = 0 requires that 
z*=z;= 
1 . . . =z;. (36) 
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Consider the case where Z = 3 and k =O. Then (35) and (36) are satisfied 
only at the symmetric solution z1 =z2 =z3 =$ and at the three asymmetric 
solutions in which one of the zi’s is - 1 and the other two are + 1. 
More generally, for all I, (36) implies that for some z>O and all i, 
zi = fz, (37) 
while (35) and (37) imply 
1 =zN+ -(I-N+)z=(2N+ -Z)z, (38) 
where N + is the number of indices i for which Zi > 0. For each choice of 
N, > N/2 there are (,‘,) distinct solutions to (38) each of which corresponds 
to a different N, member subset of Z having positive zi’s. Table 1 enumerates 
the solutions at k, = k, =. . . = k, =0 for various values of I. As we see, the 
number of solutions increases exponentially as Z increases. In fact, for Z odd, 
there are 2’-1 solutions. 
Table 1 







Although there are no simple algebraic expressions for the solutions of 
(34), (35) for general (k,, . . . , k,), we can tell a great deal about the number of 
solutions in general by using the tools of differential topology. 
Consider the map F:‘&+& where C.E{XER”ICixi=U) and 
F(x I)...) X,)=(X: )...) xz) A, with A a matrix with l’s off the diagonal and 
1 -n in each diagonal location. The solutions to eqs. (34) and (35) are 
precisely the elements of the set F-‘(k,,. . . , k,). A vector (k,, . . . , k,) is said to 
be a regular value of F if DF(x) is non-singular3 for all XE F-‘(k) or if 
F-‘(k) is empty. The degree of the map F at a regular value k is equal to 
3Here DF(xi) is the Jacobian derivative of F at xi. To evaluate it, choose global coordinate 
systems for the (n- l)-dimensional hyperplanes Z, and C,. Let F: R” - l-R"- ’ be F and I& be xi 
in these coordinate systems. Then, one can use the (n-l) x(n-1) Jacobian matrix 
((aF,/Xj(Zi))),, j=l,, __ ,“_, to represent DF(x,). By Sard’s Theorem, most points in the range of 
any F are regular values in the sense that the non-regular values (i.e., ‘critical values’) form a set 
of measure zero in the range. See, for example, Milnor (1965). 
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CxiEF- lCkJ signdet DF(x,). If F is a mapping between compact manifolds 
without boundary, like a sphere or torus, then the degree of F at k turns out 
to be the same at all regular values k in the image manifold and is called the 
degree of the map F. [See Schwartz (1969) or Milnor (1965) for a complete 
discussion of degree theory. One can also define the degree of a map using 
homology theory or by an integral formula. These methods yield a degree 
theory for non-smooth maps.] In particular, if k is not in the image of F, i.e., 
F is not onto, then the degree of F at k is zero and so the degree of the map 
F is zero. As a result, degree theory is a powerful technique for showing that 
a smooth map between two compact manifolds is onto. One need only show 
that the degree is non-zero at one regular point in the image. Furthermore, it 
is clear from the definition of degree that the number of elements in the 
inverse image of F at any regular point must be at least as large as the 
degree of the map. So, a calculation at just one point can show that every 
point is in the image of F and can give a lower bound for the size of each 
F-‘(k).” 
We would like to apply this powerful technique to our map F:xl+xo. 
However, x1 and I,, are hyperplanes, not compact spaces. Some 
compactness must be added to F in order to make the degree theory work. 
One way of accomplishing this is to require that F be a ‘proper map’. A map 
G:X+ Y is proper if the inverse image of any compact set in Y is a compact 
set in X. (If G is continuous and X is compact, G is automatically proper.) If 
X and Y are atline spaces, like I,, or even R”, then a continuous G is proper 
if the inverse image of any bounded set is bounded, i.e., if Ix, I+CC in X, then 
IG(xn)l must --*CC in I: 
If G:X-+ Y is continuous and proper, then (1) the degree of G is well- 
defined, (2) G will be surjective if the degree of G is not zero, and (3) for all 
regular values k, the cardinality of G-‘(k)Labsolute value of the degree of 
G5. [Balasko (1975) used the degree of proper mappings to derive results on 
the uniqueness of equilibrium.] 
The analysis shows that the equations system (34) and (35) has at least the 
number of solutions stated in table 2 for any (k,, . . . , k,) such that xi ki = 0. 
Since eqs. (34) and (35) are the results of an afflne change of variables from 
the Groves-Ledyard first-order conditions (22)<24) [see (40) below], these 
%ometimes, one can even use the degree of a map to show that the map is one-to-one. For 
example, if the degree of F is 1 and if det DF(x) never changes sign (i.e., F is ‘sense-preserving’), 
then each point in the range must have exactly one pre-image. This is the idea behind Mas- 
Colell’s (1979) proof of the Gale-Nikaido Theorem. 
‘To see why this statement is true, let G:X+Y be a continuous map between atTme spaces X 
and Z: One can ‘comnactifv’ X and Y to d and ? bv adding a point at intinitv to both soaces. 
The new spaces 2 aid f ian be considered as spheres. By-reqiiring that G map{ co} to* { co}, 
one defines an extension of G to a map G:_%+t The properness of G is exactly what one needs 
to show that G is continuous everywhere, even at {co}. One can now apply all the techniques of 
degree theory to G and hence to G. 
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Table 2 






10 - 11 
n - j& (-1)’ 
0 
; 
first-order conditions have at least as many solutions as are recorded in 
table 2. 
Some solutions to these equations may not be Groves-Ledyard equilibria 
because they do not satisfy the economic non-negativity constraints of the 
original problem. To study this question, we need to invert our change of 
variables and see whether the vector (m,, . . . , m,) that corresponds to a given 
solution (z,, . . . , zI) of (33) and (34), allows positive consumptions for all 
consumers. 
Since zi =(a*/(1-2))q,, we see from (30) that 
zi= & (mi-m*)+f ( > 
and 
Eq. (A.3) in appendix 1 shows that 
Y 1 Ci(m)~riY*+2 1_2 C (m~_m*)Lf~(+ril*)2 . j 1 
From (40) and (41) it follows that the solution zr,. . . , z, implies 
c.=a.y*+l/ u-*u 





It is clear from (42) that if the CQ’S are chosen so that ai Y* < II$ for all i and 
if y is chosen to be sufficiently small, then Ci < w for Ci corresponding to 
any of the solutions (z,, . . . . z,) of eqs. (34) and (35). We have argued before 
that very weak assumptions ensure that it is possible to choose the C(i’S so 
that cli Y* < w for all i. Therefore it is always possible to choose parameters 
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CQ,. . . ,u, and y so that all of the solutions to (34) and (35) are Groves- 
Ledyard equilibria. 
Appendix 1 
In this appendix, we sketch the calculations involved in progressing from 
the system (29) to the system (31), (32). Given a message vector m= 




and $=----- ’ c mh. 
I-1 h2i 
By adding and subtracting m,/(l- 1) from the left-hand side, one computes 
easily that 
I 
mi-#=l_l -(mi--ti). 64.1) 
First, let 
pi=mi-_m= y(mi-pi). 
Add and subtract m, 
compute that in (7) 
-fi to the term in parentheses in (7). Then use (A.l) to 
64.2) 
Plug (A.l) and (A.2) into (5), rearrange terms, and use (4) to find that 
Ci(m)=fXiY+- ; A(P?-fTP;). (A.31 
Plug (A.3) into (29) and rearrange terms again to find 
Finally, the change of variables (30), 
z-2 
4i’Pi +la* 
changes the system (A.4) to the system (31), (32). 
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Appendix 2 
In this appendix, we discuss the solution of the system (34),(35) for general 
(k l,...,kr). Let C,={XER’I~~X~=U} and let 
F(Xl,. . . ,%)=(&...,x,Zbc 
where A is the matrix with 1 --I in each diagonal entry and 1 in each off- 
diagonal entry. Then, F maps C, to C, and a solution of (34),(35) is an 
element of F-‘(k,, . . . , k,). 
One approach is to ‘decompose’ F into $0 ~,6 where 4: C, +R’ is the map 
4(x I,..., XI) = (XL. . . , x3, 
and $1 R’-+C, is the orthogonal projection. This decomposition works 
because the system (34) can be written as 
where Ki = -kill. For I = 2, one can show easily that + 0 C$J is one-to-one and 
onto. Fig. 1 summarizes the geometry of this approach. 
However, for Z = 3, 4 is a map from a two-dimensional hyperplane into R3. 
One easily checks that the image of I$ folds over itself around the points 
Fig. 1. tjo4 for 1=2. 
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&l,O, 0), 4(0,1,0) and $(O, 0,l). These crossings of &C,) turn out to be 
examples of the only generic singularity of a mapping from R2+R3, the 
Whitney Umbrella, as pictured in fig. 2. [See Martinet (1982) for more details 
on this singularity.] The occurrence of this singularity implies that C$ and 
therefore F is not one-to-one. So we can expect multiple equilibria. 
EEJ 
Fig. 2. Whitney’s Umbrella. 
We turn now to the more analytical approach described in the main part 
of the paper. We first show that F is proper. We then calculate the degree of 
F by calculating the degree at k = (0, 0, . . . , 0). 
To show that F is proper, we need to show that the inverse image of any 
bounded set is bounded. We will use the Euclidean norm 1 x I= (c xF)*. Let 




x+(1 -I)Zxi”+ 1 
h+j 





jF(x)12Sb2 and Xx,=1. (A.6) 
We want to show that Jx I is bounded. Suppose there is an unbounded 
sequence {x”} which satisfies (A.6). Without loss of generality, we can assume 
that XT+ + co. By (A.5) and (A.6), 
(x1’ - ~7’)~ 5 b2 for all j. (A.7) 
Therefore, each sequence of numbers {x7} is also unbounded. By taking sub- 
sequences, we can assume that 
X1, . . ..x.-++cQ as n+co, 
(‘4.8) 
4+1,..., x;+---co as n-cc. 
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For i=l,...,h, 
(xl -xl)” sP/(x; +x1)2+0, 
by (A.7) and (A.8). Similarly, for i = h + 1,. . . , I, 
(x~-(-X~))2~b2/[X;+(-X~)]2+0. 
Choose N so that for n> N, 
)<1/2Z for izh, 
and 
1<1/2Z for i>h. 
Then, for n > N, 
=(2h-Z)x”, +ijl 4 where ICu~I~CIu;I<+. 
This implies that 
I1-(2h--Z)x;1<3 for all n>N. 
This contradiction to x;+oo means that (A.6) defines a bounded set of x’s, 
i.e., F is proper. 
Since F is proper, the degree of F is well-defined and may be computed 
using any regular value. We will work with the value k =(O, . . . ,O) and will 
choose (x,, . . . , x1 _ 1) as a coordinate system for both CO and C, in R’. In this 
coordinate system, the Jacobian matrix of DF is the (I- 1) x (I- 1) matrix: 
2x, -2x, -2(1-1)x,-,-2x, 
where x,=1-x,-x2-...-x1_1. To compute the determinant of this matrix, 
first subtract the first row from each of the other rows, then add X,/Xi times 
column j to column 1 for j> 1. The result will be an upper triangular matrix 
whose determinant (the product of the diagonal entries) is the same as that 
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of our original Jacobian. Some simple algebra shows that 
detDF(x)=(-l)‘~‘[2r~‘Z’~2]~x,x2...x,~(l/x,+...+l/x,). (A.9) 
The solutions of F(z) = 0 must satisfy (35) and (36), i.e., IZi ( must equal 
some non-zero constant a independent of i. If h of the Zi’S are positive and 




a = 1/(2h - I). 
This implies that h>Z/2. It also implies that 
l/z, +. . . + l/z, #O; 
so, det DF(z) #O in (A.9) for all z in F-‘(O), i.e., 0 is a regular value of F. 
For each I and each integer h such that 1/2<h<Z, there are exactly (i) 
solutions of F(z) =O. For each of these solutions z (with Z and h fixed), 
det DF(z) will have the same sign by (A.9). If Z is fixed and h changes by one, 
the sign of all the det DF(z)‘s will also change. If h= I, this sign will be 
(- l)‘-‘. It follows that the degree of F at 0 
=Jqo, sign det DF(z) 
=(-I)‘-’ 
[(:)-(zr1)+(z:2)-4;)]7 
where I* is the least integer strictly greater than Z/2. These numbers are 
listed in table 2 for various values of 1. Since they are all non-zero, F is 
surjective; their absolute value gives a lower bound for the cardinality of 
F- l(k) for each regular value k. 
Let S denote the singular set of F in ,X1, i.e., S = {z E z, ldet DF(z) =O}. Let 
T denote the component of z:,\S which contains the regular point 
(l/Z, l/Z,. . . , l/Z). Then, the restriction 
FIT: T+F(T) 
is a one-to-one mapping. For example, when Z = 3, 
S={(xr,x2,x~)ICxi=l and x~x~+x~x~+x,x,=O}, 
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by (A.9). In our (x1,x,)-coordinates, S is the ellipse 
x:.+x,x,+x;-x,-xX,=0, 
while F(S) is a closed curve with 3 cusps in Z,. By following through the 
changes of coordinates, one notes that the ellipse S (and therefore the 
region T on which F is one-to-one) becomes larger as a*+O. Since 
a* =A’( Y*)/A( Y*), a* =0 corresponds to the quasi-linear utility function 
Xi +fi( Y) that we studied earlier [A(Y) = 11 where the corresponsing F is 
globally one-to-one. 
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